Description

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THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze, interpret, and apply provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Volume 1 of the casebook covers the District of Columbia Circuit and the First through the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.* * * The statutory purposes of the FDCPA are to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. 1692(e). "The legislative history of the passage of the FDCPA explains that the need for the FDCPA arose" because of a number of different "collection abuses," such as the use of "'obscene or profane language, threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, and] misrepresentation of a consumer's legal rights.'" Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696). The legislative history of the FDCPA is clear that the statute also was intended to "eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person." S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1699. The report of the House of Representatives explained: This bill also protects people who do not owe money at all. In the collector's zeal, collection efforts are often aimed at the wrong person either because of mistaken identity or mistaken facts. This bill will make collectors behave responsibly towards people with whom they deal.... Certainly a person who has a common name and is being hounded by a debt collector because of the debts of another person deserves the protection this legislation will offer. In far too many cases debt collectors do not even bother to double check common names before beginning collection efforts.H.R. Rep. 95-131 at 8 (1977). Wagner v. Chiari & Ilecki, LLP, 973 F. 3d 154 (2nd Cir. 2020)