Description

This thesis concerns the concept(s) of 'a right'. It analyses different kinds of philosophical accounts of rights ('models' in Chapter 2 and 'theories' in Chapters 4 and 5), along with the concepts of rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication. There is a long tradition of philosophising about rights. Its connections to the philosophy of law and other areas of philosophy, however, have largely been neglected.1 This chapter therefore addresses certain methodological issues that help shape, drive, and plague legal philosophy (and thus the philosophy of rights). While legal philosophers have been paying greater attention to these sorts of concerns lately, the task of even merely elucidating them remains incomplete. This chapter aims to bring to the forefront some interrelated (and equally important) problems that have either gone unaddressed, or received far less coverage thus far - especially their role within issues that have already been addressed. It aims to do so without delving too deep into the doctrinal commitments of particular legal theories, and without pretending that philosophy can be reduced to a determinable or enumerable set of procedures.